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INTRODUCTION 
Terrorism prosecution is a unique and innovative sphere in the American 
justice paradigm.  Terrorism, unlike virtually every other criminal offense, is 
primarily subject to preventive prosecutions—that is, investigating, indicting, 
and prosecuting prospective terrorists before they can carry out their violent 
plans.  The Department of Justice (“DOJ”) adopted this prophylactic strategy 
in wake of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks in an effort to combat 
future terrorist endeavors.1  The DOJ’s new modus operandi was seemingly 
born from a desire to protect the country from future catastrophic attacks by 
authorizing federal agents to intervene earlier in the criminal timeline and 
prosecute suspects before they could set their schemes in motion.  A study of 
all terrorism-related convictions from 2001 to 2010 found that 94.2% of 
those convictions “have been either preventive prosecution cases or cases 
that involved elements of prevention prosecution.”2  However, this preven-
tative posture has not been reserved only for suspects with large-scale or even 
discrete plans for terrorism, but rather it has been used against any and all 
persons suspected of terrorism. 
More than any other law, the material support statutes, 18 U.S.C. 
§ 2339A and § 2339B, have embodied this policy, and have been wielded as 
powerful tools in anticipatory terrorism prosecutions.3  The Supreme Court 
has said as much, definitively ruling that “[t]he material-support statute is, 
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 1 Wadie E. Said, Humanitarian Law Project and the Supreme Court’s Construction of Terrorism, 2011 BYU 
L. REV. 1455, 1479 (2011). 
 2 WADIE E. SAID, CRIMES OF TERROR: THE LEGAL AND POLITICAL IMPLICATIONS OF FEDERAL 
TERRORISM PROSECUTIONS 4-5 (2015) (quoting STEPHEN DOWNS & KATHY MANLEY, PROJECT 
SALAM & NAT’L COAL. TO PROTECT CIV. FREEDOMS, INVENTING TERRORISTS: THE 
LAWFARE OF PREEMPTIVE PROSECUTION 2 (Jeanne Finley ed., 2014), http://www.pro-
jectsalam.org/inventing-terrorists-study.pdf). 
 3 18 U.S.C. §§ 2339A–B (2016) (making it a crime to provide material support or resources for a 
range of activities).  
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on its face, a preventive measure—it criminalizes not terrorist attacks them-
selves, but aid that makes the attacks more likely to occur.”4  Although 
§ 2339A was initially passed some seven years prior to 9/11, its increasingly 
broad reach has made it a regular charge lodged by the United States gov-
ernment against alleged terrorists or alleged aiders and abettors of terrorism.  
Section 2339A criminalizes inchoate actions; most notably, it criminalizes 
actions taken in preparation for a conspiracy to be made.5  Section 2339b, 
on the other hand, imposes a form of strict liability for support provided to 
designated foreign terrorist organizations, criminalizing “charity, solidarity, 
religious practice, and speech.”6  Under both prongs of this statute, many 
otherwise legal actions have fallen under the scope of the DOJ’s criminal 
jurisdiction.  Naturally, serious tension with several sacrosanct constitutional 
freedoms has grown apparent. 
In particular, § 2339A and B prosecutions have created questions under, 
among others, the First and Fifth Amendments, resulting in litigation over 
the statutes’ infringement on the rights guaranteed by those provisions.  The 
material support statutes ostensibly infringe upon due process, freedom of 
speech, and equal protection interests, and despite a deluge of lower federal 
court rulings finding these individual infringements to be reasonable or una-
voidable, many § 2339A and B prosecutions seem increasingly untenable un-
der the Constitution.  Either the Constitution provides the same protections 
and safeguards for all criminal suspects, or the protections it espouses are 
nothing more than hollow words, at the mercy of the government’s capri-
ciousness.  If the former is true, then a significant portion of the material 
support prosecutions are, in varying degrees of severity, in conflict with the 
aforementioned constitutional rights. 
Prophylactic prosecution relies on a necessary enlargement of complicity 
and conspiracy liability, which will likely, in light of American jurispru-
dence’s preference for trans-substantivity, expand beyond the terrorism 
realm, therefore increasing criminal liability at the expense of longstanding 
enumerated rights.  Moreover, anticipatory prosecution augments the risk of 
false-positives, or prosecuting individuals who would not have gone on to 
commit the act, as well as the risk of prosecuting “dissenting thought uncou-
pled from culpable action.”7  If the Constitution is to retain its supreme pro-
tections, these problematic prosecutions, particularly those pursuant to 
§§ 2339A and B, must be struck down and prohibited by the courts. 
	
 4 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 35 (2010). 
 5 See Robert M. Chesney, Beyond Conspiracy? Anticipatory Prosecution and the Challenge of Unaffiliated Terror-
ism, 80 S. CAL. L. REV. 425, 480 (2007) (describing the reach of § 2339A to highly inchoate crimes). 
 6 Id. at 478 (noting that § 2339B imposes a form of strict liability); see also SAID, supra note 2, at 6 
(explaining the broad range of activities the government has criminalized under the material sup-
port statute). 
 7 Chesney, supra note 5, at 426, 427. 
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For the purposes of this analysis, only terrorism prosecutions pursuant to 
the material support statutes will be considered.  By way of clarification, ma-
terial support prosecutions are not per se unreasonable or irreconcilable with 
the Constitution; however, certain provisions of §§ 2339A and B, and the 
manner in which the DOJ has leveraged these provisions in prosecuting al-
leged terrorists creates serious tension with a variety of constitutional protec-
tions.  Those provisions, the related prosecutions, and their constitutionality 
are the primary subjects of the forthcoming paragraphs.  This analysis will 
begin with an overview of the statutes themselves and then turn to an evalu-
ation of certain material support prosecutions under the lens of the constitu-
tional rights to due process and freedom of speech and association.  Lastly, it 
will consider feasible alternatives to combatting and preventing terrorism 
without, or with a curtailed, material support regime.  This analysis will not 
dedicate time delving into arguments that have been definitively rejected by 
the courts, and instead will focus on viable or live arguments still feasible in 
litigation.  Moreover, due to both time and space constraints, this will not be 
an exhaustive constitutional analysis, and it will be limited just to arguments 
under the First and Fifth Amendments. 
I.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A, § 2339B 
A.  18 U.S.C. § 2339A 
Section 2339A, initially passed in 1994, criminalizes providing material 
support to anyone with the knowledge or intention that the provisions will be 
used to commit one or more of a sundry of predicate offenses.8  It is most 
prevalently utilized where the suspects are not linked to a foreign terrorist 
organization (“FTO”), and are therefore not subject to § 2339B, which has a 
comparatively lower scienter requirement, and is accordingly easier to suc-
cessfully lodge against terror suspects.9  Section 2339A enumerates, in perti-
nent part: “Offense.¾Whoever provides material support or resources or 
conceals or disguises the nature, location, source, or ownership of material 
support or resources, knowing or intending that they are to be used in prepara-
tion for, or in carrying out, a violation of [various laws].”10  The statute lists 
a multitude of underlying crimes, where the provision of material support to 
	
 8 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a). 
 9 Chesney, supra note 5, at 475-76, 478 (noting that § 2339A charges are “particularly important in 
cases where there does not appear to be an FTO link” and that “of the twenty-three defendants 
charged with one or more violations of § 2339A, only six . . . were charged with a § 2339B, FTO-
based violation”).  
 10 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(a) (emphasis added).  
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commit those offenses is criminalized.  These predicate offenses include: de-
struction of aircraft, violence at international airports, damaging nuclear fa-
cilities, bombing, murder of a foreign dignitary, conspiracy to commit certain 
violent crimes overseas, and so on and so forth.11  One serious concern here 
is the heightened level of inchoateness, or the distance the accused was from 
actually executing the nefarious plan, that is being criminalized under this 
law.  It effectively creates criminal liability for whoever knowingly provides 
or conceals material support in preparation for a conspiracy to be formed to 
commit a predicate offense, many of which are conspiracies as well.12 
Conspiracy liability is itself inchoate, criminalizing the intent to commit 
a crime where that intent is joined with the act of agreeing with others to 
perpetrate the crime.13  Importantly, conspiracy liability only requires speci-
ficity to the type of crime to be executed; details on carrying out the crime 
itself are unnecessary.14  Thus, furnishing material support for the prepara-
tion of an agreement to engage in certain criminal offenses is made illegal by 
§ 2339A—in other words, “conspiracies to provide material support to con-
spiracies” are criminalized.15  Professor Robert Chesney has aptly described 
this § 2339A as “prohibiting the provision of support with  intent to facilitate 
either a violation of a predicate statute or activity preliminary to such a vio-
lation.”16  This issue has already reached the courts and will be subject to 
further analysis. 
 In addition, the legislators defined several key terms, including material 
support: 
[T]he term “material support or resources” means any property, tangible or 
intangible, or service, including currency or monetary instruments or finan-
cial securities, financial services, lodging, training, expert advice or assis-
tance, safehouses, false documentation or identification, communications 
equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances, explosives, personnel (1 or 
more individuals who may be or include oneself), and transportation, except 
medicine or religious materials[.]17 
This definition is, in a word, broad, casting a wide net over a myriad of ac-
tions, including the provision of oneself as “material support.”  Nevertheless, 
the statute is narrowed by the ascribed mens rea requirement of “knowing or 
	
 11 Id. 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Chesney, supra note 5, at 448 (defining conspiracy liability). 
 14 Id. at 451. 
 15 DANIEL C. RICHMAN, KATE STITH & WILLIAM J. STUNTZ, DEFINING FEDERAL CRIMES 571 
(Vicki Been et al. eds., 2014). 
 16 Chesney, supra note 5, at 479. 
 17 18 U.S.C. § 2339A(b)(1). 
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intending,”18 effectively destroying strict liability or liability for mere negli-
gent conduct.  Courts have found this scienter requirement to be significant 
in determining that § 2339A is indeed constitutional.19  Nevertheless, the 
“conspire to conspire” liability “impose[s] a form of inchoate criminal liabil-
ity that otherwise might exceed the reach of federal law,” making the statute 
a valuable device in anticipatory prosecutions.20 
B.  18 U.S.C. § 2339B 
Section 2339B, initially passed in 1996,21 is confined to support provided 
to FTOs.  It has been the government’s statute of choice in anticipatory pros-
ecutions, taking up ubiquitous residence in terrorism cases.22  In pertinent 
part, the statute reads: 
Unlawful conduct.¾Whoever knowingly provides material support or re-
sources to a foreign terrorist organization, or attempts or conspires to do so, 
shall be fined under this title or imprisoned not more than 20 years, or 
both . . . . To violate this paragraph, a person must have knowledge that the 
organization is a designated terrorist organization (as defined in subsection 
(g)(6)), that the organization has engaged or engages in terrorist activity (as de-
fined in section 212(a)(3)(B) of the Immigration and Nationality Act), or that the 
organization has engaged or engages in terrorism (as defined in section 140(d)(2) 
of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Years 1988 and 1989).23 
A designated terrorist organization is one that is so designated by the Secre-
tary of State.24  To complete such a designation, the Secretary must find that 
the group in question is a “foreign organization”; that it engages or intends 
to engage in “terrorist activity . . . or terrorism”; and that they are a threat to 
national security.25  Relatedly, terrorism is defined as: “premeditated, politi-
cally motivated violence perpetrated against noncombatant targets by sub-
national groups or clandestine agents.”26  Section 2339B excludes independ-
ent conduct, free of ties to any terrorist organization: “Individuals who act 
entirely independently of the foreign terrorist organization to advance its 
	
 18 Id. § 2339A(a). 
 19 E.g., United States v. Awan, 459 F. Supp. 2d 167, 179 (E.D.N.Y. 2006) (stating that where a statute’s 
prohibited conduct is made specific and easily understandable to a person of “ordinary intelli-
gence,” then that statute is not impermissibly vague); United States v. Sattar, 314 F. Supp. 2d 279, 
305 (S.D.N.Y. 2004) (finding that § 2339A, which “prohibits the provision of material support or 
resources knowing or intending that they are to be used in preparation for, or in carrying out, a 
violation of certain enumerated federal crimes,” is not unconstitutionally overbroad). 
 20 Chesney, supra note 5, at 479. 
 21 Antiterrorism and Effective Dealth Penalty Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-132, § 303, 110 Stat. 1214, 
1250 (codified as amended at 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (2016)). 
 22 SAID, supra note 2, at 51 (describing the widespread use of § 2339B in terrorism prosecution). 
 23 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2016). 
 24 8 U.S.C. § 1189(a)(1), (d)(4) (2006). 
 25 Id. § 1189(a)(1)(A)–(C). 
 26 22 U.S.C. § 2656f(d)(2) (2006). 
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goals or objectives shall not be considered to be working under the foreign 
terrorist organization’s direction and control.”27  Moreover, material support 
here shares the definition enumerated in § 2339A.28 
To establish liability, the statute only requires that a person knowingly 
furnish, attempt to furnish, or conspire to furnish aid to an FTO—a showing 
of specific intent to further or support the group’s terrorism is markedly ab-
sent.29  This means that one can donate or provide another form of support 
to an FTO, not with the intent to facilitate terrorism, but for some other 
purpose that the organization so engages, and that aid, intended to further a 
nonviolent, potentially even humanitarian endeavor, will still spur criminal 
liability per § 2339B.  Many FTOs do not consider themselves terrorists or 
malevolent actors; yes, they engage in violence, but it is, in their view, justi-
fied, and they typically engage in a variety of other practices that, for exam-
ple, includes education, tending to the wellbeing of their communities, and 
advancing the social capital of their historically oppressed subgroup.30 
This was the cause of action in Humanitarian Law Project, a salient, and 
rare, Supreme Court opinion on the constitutionality of § 2339B.  The re-
spondents challenged the statute’s criminalization of nonviolent support to 
the Partiya Karkeran Kurdistan, or PKK, and the Liberation Tigers of 
Tamil Eelam, or LTTE.31  Each group is involved in both violent and non-
violent endeavors in advancing the interests of the ethnic groups they repre-
sent, the Kurds and Tamils, respectively.32  Respondents sought to instruct 
and train these groups to use international law, political advocacy, and the 
United Nations to further their causes.33  Respondents argued that prohibit-
ing the petitioners from providing this type of support is a violation of the 
First Amendment’s right to freedom of speech; however, the Court found 
that Congress had clearly intended such support to attach criminal liability 
under § 2339B because of the fungibility of support provided to FTOs, who 
“are so tainted by their criminal conduct that any contribution to such an 
organization facilitates that conduct.”34  That is, any support provided to 
	
 27 § 2339B(h); see also Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 23 (2010) (holding that 
§ 2339B does not prohibit independent advocacy). 
 28 § 2339B(g)(4) 
 29 § 2339B(a)(1). 
 30 See generally PARTIYA KARKERÊN KURDISTAN, https://www.pkkonline.com/en/ (last visited Sept. 
16, 2017) (the PKK’s official website listing its objectives, its engagements, as well as news and 
articles about the group, thus demonstrating that the PKK is involved in more than just violent 
endeavors). 
 31 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 8-10. 
 32 Id. at 14-15. 
 33 Id. 
 34 Id. at 37-38 (internal quotations omitted) (quoting Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act 
of 1996 § 301(a)(7), Pub. L. No. 104-132, 110 Stat. 1247, note following 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Find-
ings and Purpose)). 
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such an organization will only free up their remaining resources to be put 
towards the terrorism they perpetrate.35  The Court proceeded to approve 
the statute and its reach to nonviolent support following a strict scrutiny in-
quiry, validating § 2339B’s freedom of speech conscription.36  The Court’s 
finding here will be subject to further analysis in the below sections. 
II.  DUE PROCESS TENSIONS 
Both §§ 2339A and B present apparent conflicts with the Constitution’s 
expansive due process protection.  Many of these conflicts have already been 
raised at the district and circuit court level, but only one pertinent case has 
received direct Supreme Court scrutiny—the aforementioned Humanitarian 
Law Project case.  Thus, many of these issues have not yet been definitively 
decided, nor have all issues been rigorously litigated in front of a tribunal.  
Indeed, some of these issues have only been considered in dicta. 
The Fifth Amendment states that no person shall “be deprived of life, 
liberty, or property, without due process of law.”37  The Supreme Court has 
long interpreted due process to contain both procedural and substantive pro-
tections from actions taken by the government.38  Due process has enveloped 
a variety of protections, including actual process, for example, which essen-
tially requires that in the case of fundamental rights, some sort of procedure 
and a real opportunity for affected parties to oppose the government’s actions 
be afforded.39  Moreover, due process is generally the constitutional touch-
stone for the mens rea stipulation in criminal law.40  Due process challenges 
to the material support statutes are standard, though these challenges take 
different forms. 
A.  Section 2339A and Due Process 
Section 2339A has been primarily challenged under the aforementioned 
“conspire to conspire” liability that it creates, which is not dependent on the 
predicate crime ever actually being executed.41  Although, this has not been 
	
 35 Id. 
 36 Id. at 36. 
 37 U.S. CONST. amend. V. 
 38 Compare Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 333-35 (1976) (discussing when procedural safeguards 
are required under due process), with Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 224-25 (1961) (requir-
ing personal culpability for criminal liability). 
 39 See generally Eldridge, 424 U.S. at 332-35 (outlining what due process requires before certain property 
or liberty interests can be deprived). 
 40 See generally Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-27 (explaining that mens rea for criminal punishment is required 
to establish the sufficiency of guilt because guilt is personal). 
 41 See Chesney, supra note 5, at 491-92 (explaining that § 2339A does not require a substantial step 
towards the commission of a predicate offense and discussing the utility and risks of this approach). 
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outright classified by many courts as a due process question, it does raise 
substantive due process concerns.  Due process stipulates mens rea as a limit 
on criminal liability; similarly, due process ascribes limitations to conspiracy 
liability—requiring specific conduct, such as an agreement to perpetrate a 
crime, be present—and to attempt liability—requiring that that a substantial 
step be taken towards the commission of a crime.42 
An appeal containing an objection to the “conspiracy to conspiracy” lia-
bility created by § 2339A was notably taken up in United States v. Khan.43  
Therein, defendants appealed their terrorism convictions, one of which was 
pursuant to conspiracy under § 2339A, where the predicate offense was also 
a conspiracy.44  Defendants challenged this conviction, arguing that it is in-
appropriate and unjust for criminal liability to attach in a multi-inchoate of-
fense such as this, or, in other words, that conspiring to conspire is not crim-
inal behavior.45  The court dismantled this argument, holding that the 
statutory text of § 2339A expressly permitted “one conspiracy to serve as a 
predicate for another conspiracy.  Nothing about this framework is uncon-
stitutional, improper, or even unusual.”46  So long as the two conspiracies are 
“distinct offenses with entirely different objectives,” there is no constitutional 
issue.47  To fortify this finding, the court pointed to the Racketeer Influenced 
and Corrupt Organizations (“RICO”) paradigm, where analogous dual con-
spiracy liability is permitted.48 
Notwithstanding the decisive Khan ruling, there is a substantial difference 
between the predicate conspiracy liability in the RICO conspiracy paradigm 
and the material support paradigm.  Primarily, the underlying offenses are 
more heinous, and entail a heightened level of criminal character in the RICO 
scheme.  For example, in United States v. Ruggiero, the RICO case cited by the 
Khan court, the predicate conspiracies were conspiracy to murder and conspir-
acy to distribute Quaaludes.49  These offenses are not the same as a conspiracy 
to provide material support to be used in preparation for a conspiracy to com-
mit an enumerated, terrorist-related offense.  The underlying offense in the 
material support realm is the § 2339A conspiracy to provide material support 
because it attaches one of the secondary offenses, i.e. conspiracy to destroy an 
	
 42 See id. at 453 (citing United States v. Provenzano, 615 F.2d 37, 44 (2d Cir. 1980) (requiring an 
agreement to commit a particular offense)); MODEL PENAL CODE AND COMMENTARIES § 
5.01(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST., Proposed Official Draft 1962). 
 43 461 F.3d 477, 493 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 44 Id. at 483, 486–87; 18 U.S.C. § 956 (2016) (criminalizing a conspiracy to kill, kidnap, maim, or 
injure persons, or damage property in a foreign country). 
 45 Khan, 461 F.3d at 492. 
 46 Id. at 492–93. 
 47 Id. (citing United States v. Pungitore, 910 F.2d 1084, 1135 (3d Cir. 1990)). 
 48 Id. (citing United States v. Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913, 918 (2d Cir. 1984)).   
 49 Ruggiero, 726 F.2d 913 at 918. 
	
Dec. 2017] MATERIAL SUPPORT STATUTES 481 
aircraft, and without it, the secondary offense could not be brought.  In the 
RICO context, like in Ruggiero, the underlying offense is not the RICO con-
spiracy, but the predicate conspiracies, i.e. conspiracy to murder, that attach 
the RICO conspiracy, which could not have otherwise been brought.50 
The Khan court made an unreasonable comparison by analogizing the 
conspiracies to murder and distribute lethal drugs in connection with a 
RICO conspiracy, with a conspiracy to provide material support to prepare 
for a conspiracy to commit a crime.51  The latter is more inchoate and in-
volves considerable separation from the suspect and the would-be terrorist 
attack.  The crime in question is not imminent, not specific, nor is it even 
guaranteed to occur—the personal culpability is lower here relative to such 
culpability in the RICO context.  In regards to due process, the liability un-
der § 2339A attaches so early and at such an inchoate time that it seems un-
reasonable; this alone is not sufficient to establish unconstitutionality, but no 
other statute or liability regime attaches in this manner, including the RICO 
sphere, as suggested by the Khan court. 
Additionally, consider the premature liability that attaches here and how 
it contravenes the longstanding abandonment defense in attempt doctrine.  It 
is clear that, without the material support statute, individuals conspiring to 
provide material support to prepare for a conspiracy to commit an enumer-
ated offense would not be liable under attempt doctrine.52  Attempt liability 
distinguishes between mere preparations and actual attempts, and typically 
requires an intention to commit the crime as well as a substantial, overt step 
to be taken towards the commission of that crime.53  The abandonment de-
fense is a full defense that is available up until the point where criminal liability 
attaches; abandonment occurs when a suspect abandons the effort to commit 
the crime and “manifest[s] a complete and voluntary renunciation of [the] 
criminal purpose.”54  This is valuable in allowing would-be miscreants to re-
consider their criminal endeavors with an incentive to abandon the crime and 
avoid all liability.  But in the Section 2339A context, liability attaches so early 
on and at such an inchoate level that the abandonment defense is not viable. 
	
 50 Id. (clarifying that to satisfy the RICO conspiracy’s statutory requirements, each defendant has been 
charged with at least two predicate acts, all of which are conspiracies). 
51 See Khan, 461 F.3d at 493 (comparing Ruggiero to the instant case because in both the “[overarch-
ing] conspiracy and predicate conspiracy are distinct offenses with entirely different objectives.”  
(alterations in original) (citing Ruggiero, 726 F.2d at 918)). 
 52 MODEL PENAL CODE § 5.01(1)(c) (AM. LAW INST. 1962) (mandating that someone may be held 
culpable under attempt liability when, having the required mental state, he does or fails to do some-
thing that is an act or omission that is considered a substantial step towards the commission of a 
crime). 
 53 Id. 
 54 Id. § 5.01(4). 
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Relatedly, without § 2339A, those “conspiring to conspire” would not be 
liable under conspiracy for the enumerated offense; that is, without the ma-
terial support provision, the government would not be able to charge the 
suspect with the predicate conspiracy.55  Conspiracy liability generally at-
taches when an agreement is made with the intention to commit a specific 
crime. 56  Section 2339A is the only option available to prosecutors to crimi-
nally charge suspects, who otherwise have yet to violate any laws.57  This is 
problematic because no other regime allows for conspiracies to be predicate 
offenses for conspiracies at such inchoate and personally inculpable levels.  
Despite Congress’ decision to structure the statute in this manner, which the 
courts have afforded great weight to in analyzing its constitutionality, 58 this 
is violative of the spirit of due process and the protections it accords to citizens 
in criminal punishments. 
B.  Section 2339B and Due Process 
The due process issues that arise under § 2339B are distinct from those 
discussed in the previous section.  Here, defendants rely on Scales v. United 
States to argue that due process requires specific intent to further a group’s 
unlawful ends be proven to prosecute membership; mere membership alone, 
defendants contend, cannot be constitutionally criminalized.59  It is well es-
tablished that criminal punishment cannot be sanctioned without some level 
of personal culpability.60  Moreover, for criminal liability to lie in association 
prosecutions, specific intent to further the illegal objectives of that group must 
be shown to satisfy the personal culpability requirement.61  Section 2339B 
does not adopt a specific-intent requirement and instead establishes liability 
only where material support is provided to an FTO.62  This discrepancy has 
been the subject of various litigations.  In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court 
	
 55 See Chesney, supra note 5, at 479-80 (arguing that the broad scope of the material support provision 
in §2339A provides the government with a greater preventative capacity). 
 56 Id. at 448. 
 57 Id. at 479-80 (explaining that § 2339A is an important tool for prosecutors because it applies re-
gardless of if the predicate offense actually occurs). 
 58 See United States v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 493 (4th Cir. 2006) (stating that the statutes, and accord-
ingly their authors, “expressly contemplate allowing one conspiracy to serve as the predicate offense 
for another conspiracy” in defending their legality). 
 59 367 U.S. 203, 225, 227 (1961) (holding that associational relationships must be accompanied by 
specific criminal activity to be consistent with the law of conspiracy and complicity). 
 60 See Benjamin Yaster, Resetting Scales: An Examination of Due Process Rights in Material Support Prosecutions, 
83 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1353, 1356 (2008) (citing Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 251-52 
(1952)) (asserting that the belief that punishment and retribution are only appropriate for those who 
are culpable is fundamental to American criminal law). 
 61 Id. at 1358 (citing United States v. Blair, 54 F.3d 639, 642 (10th Cir. 1995)). 
 62 18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a)(1) (2016) (imposing liability for anyone who “knowingly provides material 
support or resources to a foreign terrorist organization”). 
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refuted this argument, and refused to impute the intent requirement to 
§ 2339B.63  Finding that Congress made it abundantly obvious that it had no 
desire to augment the mens rea requirement in the way the defendants 
sought, and that Scales was distinguishable from the material support statute, 
the Court summarily dismissed this argument.64  Nevertheless, the Court 
never considered the due process element of this argument; it merely held 
that even though it will construe legislation so that it comports with the Con-
stitution, it will not revise a statute, against the will of Congress, in a way that 
will ultimately pervert the purpose of the statute.65  Yet, if it can be demon-
strated that the Constitution does indeed require a specific intent require-
ment for association prosecutions, then the Court would have no choice but 
to construe the statute accordingly, or strike down the relevant provisions as 
unconstitutional. 
Professor Benjamin Yaster argues that because Court in Scales bifurcated 
its analysis, it found both First and Fifth Amendment rights in association 
prosecutions—freedom of association and freedom from criminal sanctions 
without personal culpability, respectively.66  Evidently, membership liability 
was found to be more than just a province of the First Amendment’s freedom 
of association; it also is subject to the due process stipulation that criminal 
punishment can only be doled out where one is personally culpable, here 
meaning that she intended to further the illicit ends of the organization or 
that she had a “sufficiently substantial” relationship to that group.67  The due 
process test used in Scales “prohibits punishment of a defendant for ‘the rela-
tionship of [her] status or conduct to [another’s] concededly criminal activ-
ity’ when that relationship is less than substantial.”68  Moreover, Professor 
Yaster states that “the touchstone is simply the nature of the defendant’s con-
duct and her mental state, and whether these amount to a finding that, in-
deed, the defendant was personally culpable for the illegal acts an associate 
committed.”69  In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court never expressly dis-
cussed the due process arguments against mere membership liability, failing 
	
 63 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 17 (2010) (asserting that § 2339B had no textual 
basis to require intent in some circumstances). 
 64 Id. at 16-18 (declining to find a requirement for specific intent in § 2339B because such a require-
ment was not supported by case law or congressional intent). 
 65 Id. at 17 (“Although this Court will often strain to construe legislation so as to save it against consti-
tutional attack, it must not and will not carry this to the point of perverting the purpose of a statute.”  
(quoting Scales v. United States, 367 U.S. 203, 211 (1961))). 
 66 Yaster, supra note 60, at 1360, 1372. 
 67 Id. at 1360 (questioning the relationship between freedom of association and a prohibition on guilt 
by association); id. at 1373 (citing Scales, 367 U.S. at 225). 
 68 Id. at 1374 (alterations in original) (quoting Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25). 
 69 Id. (citing Scales, 367 U.S. at 224-25). 
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to even discuss the sufficiently substantial relationship outlined in Scales.  Ac-
cordingly, a defendant who maintains this due process argument, citing the 
extensive judicial history that applied and expanded Scales to prohibit such 
criminalization, may receive a more narrow analysis from the Court.70  This 
tension between § 2339B, Scales, and the due process right will continue to be 
the basis of criminal defenses to material support prosecutions because of the 
evident inconsistency and disharmony between the protections espoused by 
the Constitution and § 2339B’s essentially strict liability regime. 
One argument that was not made in Humanitarian Law Project and was thus 
not subject to the Court’s scrutiny, was whether § 2339B “grants too much 
enforcement discretion to the Government.”71  This is a derivative of the due 
process vagueness argument, maintaining that the statutes vagueness facili-
tates its arbitrary and even discriminatory enforcement, violating the Fifth 
Amendment.72 
It is unclear whether there is enough evidence for this standard to be sat-
isfied here.  Nevertheless, it is no secret that seemingly the vast majority of 
suspects accused of terrorism are either Muslim or are connected to one of 
the Middle East or the sub-Asian continent, as evidenced by Guantanamo 
Bay’s detainee demographics: every one of its 780 prisoners were either Mus-
lim or resided in a so called “Muslim majority” country.73  A defendant may 
attempt to establish discriminatory enforcement to compel a finding of illicit 
enforcement discretion.  In Khan, the defendants made a similar selective 
prosecution argument, invoking the Constitution’s equal protection right.74  
They contended that the material support statutes were not being used to 
prosecute individuals who provided material support to the Irish Republican 
Army and the Cambodian Freedom Fighters, two designated FTOs that 
have no connection to Islam or the so-called Muslim-world.75  The court 
brusquely rejected this argument, holding that the defendants failed to show 
that individuals similarly situated to themselves were selectively not prose-
cuted under § 2339A or B, and that “[t]he Executive branch has the right to 
focus its prosecutorial energies on alleged terrorists groups that present the 
most direct threat to the United States and its interests.”76  Notwithstanding 
	
 70 See generally id. (citing a multitude of cases applying or expanding Scales). 
 71 Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010). 
 72 See City of Chicago v. Morales, 527 U.S. 41, 64 (1999) (holding that statutes must provide “sufficiently 
specific limits on the enforcement discretion of the police ‘to meet the constitutional standards for 
definiteness and clarity.’” (quoting City of Chicago v. Morales, 687 N.E.2d 53, 64 (Ill. 1997))). 
 73  Andre Scheinkman, Alan McLean, Jeremy Ashkenas, Archie Tse & Jacob Harris, A History of the 
Detainee Population, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 10, 2017, 10:40 PM), https://www.nytimes.com/interac-
tive/projects/guantanamo.  
 74 U.S. v. Khan, 461 F.3d 477, 497-98 (4th Cir. 2006). 
 75 Id. at 498. 
 76 Id. 
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the second part of that determination, a showing of discriminatory enforce-
ment, as a result of excessive enforcement discretion, is a viable claim where 
claimants can point to similarly situated individuals that received favorable 
prosecutorial treatment, which would presumably defeat the material sup-
port charge.77  However, it is unclear what exactly will establish that the stat-
ute failed to meet the Constitution’s requirement of “definiteness and clar-
ity.”78  A showing of disparate impact through a statistical analysis of all those 
prosecuted under § 2339A and B would be insufficient to state an equal pro-
tection violation under the Fourteenth Amendment.79  An additional show-
ing of discriminatory intent would also be required under the aforemen-
tioned claim.80  It is not immediately clear whether the courts would require 
such a burdensome showing to make a discriminatory enforcement claim 
under due process, but, ostensibly, a showing of disparate impact in material 
support prosecutions is reasonably plausible. 
III.  FREEDOM OF SPEECH TENSIONS 
This analysis will be cabined to § 2339B because it has been the primary 
and regular subject of freedom of speech attacks.81  Forms of speech can con-
stitute material support and accordingly § 2339B does restrict the freedom of 
speech.  The Court conceded as much in Humanitarian Law Project, but follow-
ing a balancing test, the constraint, and the statute, were upheld.82  This is 
part of a broader restriction on speech across the federal criminal landscape, 
where “endangerment speech crimes,” or “prohibitions that target expres-
sion that ostensibly increase the likelihood of inflicting future harm.”83  The 
increase in statutory limitations to expression and speech are closely tied to 
the government’s recent emphasis on prophylactic prosecutions.84 
	
 77 See Morales, 527 U.S. at 51, 64 (finding the city ordinance such that it would lead to arbitrary en-
forcement).  But see Holder v. Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. 1, 20 (2010) (enforcing rule that 
“[a] plaintiff who engages in some conduct that is clearly proscribed cannot complain of the vague-
ness of the law as applied to the conduct of others.”). 
 78 Morales, 527 U.S. at 64. 
 79 See generally Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 238-39 (1976) (requiring a showing of discrimina-
tory intent, not just disparate impact, to establish an equal protection claim). 
 80 Id. 
 81 See generally Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 14 (analyzing the scope of § 2339B burdens on free 
speech); United States v. Mehanna, 735 F.3d 32, 40 (1st Cir. 2013) (exploring the fine line between 
national security and protection of First Amendment rights). 
 82 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 36-37 (2010). 
 83 See Michael Buchhandler-Raphael, Overcriminalizing Speech, 36 CARDOZO L. REV. 1667, 1671 (2015) 
(detailing recent federal statutes and cases that restrict expression and speech to determine when it 
is appropriate to criminalize speech). 
 84 Id. at 1675. 
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In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court balanced § 2339B’s restriction on 
coordinated speech with an FTO in the form of training for peaceful redress, 
and the government’s compelling interest in preventing terrorism; finding 
that independent advocacy and speech are protected, and that the statute 
criminalizes only speech synchronized with an FTO, or speech at the direc-
tion of an FTO, which due to the fungibility of support, increases the likeli-
hood of terror attacks, the Court ruled that the restriction was permissible.85  
But the dissent therein argued against fungibility, questioning whether 
providing a multi-faceted FTO, like the PKK, with training on petitioning 
the United Nations for peaceful resolution of disputes would indeed lead the 
PKK to have an increased capacity for carrying out terrorism.86  The dissent 
argues that the majority’s ruling does not comport with the First Amend-
ment, and that the statute should properly be read as to criminalize “First 
Amendment protected pure speech and association only when the defendant 
knows or intends that those activities will assist the organization’s unlawful 
terrorist actions.”87  The government’s fungibility argument is tenuous at 
best, and as the dissent pointed out, the government failed to provide any 
empirical data demonstrating that material support in the form of speech is 
fungible, thereby increasing an organization’s ability to conduct terrorism.88  
It is unlikely that the fungibility argument is capacious enough to cover all 
speech that may fall under the scope of § 2339B.  Short of the Department 
of Justice developing empirical evidence, it is possible that a future case, un-
der the right circumstances, could exploit this weakness in the majority’s 
opinion in Humanitarian Law Project, thus successfully challenging the 
§ 2339B’s constraint on the First Amendment. 
In Humanitarian Law Project, the Court repeatedly maintained that § 2339B 
did not interfere with independent speech or advocacy, and its eventual ruling 
upholding the statute’s restriction on speech was based, in part, on the deter-
mination that independent advocacy was not infringed upon in the case.89  
Yet, in United States v. Mehanna, the court ruled that the decision in Humanitarian 
Law Project, and the statute itself, did not stipulate that a suspect have a direct 
connection with the FTO to be liable.90  In an apparent blow to the independ-
ent advocacy protection, the defendant’s § 2339B conviction for translating 
an FTO’s propaganda into English and posting it online was upheld despite 
there being limited, possibly insufficient, evidence connecting the defendant 
to the FTO.91  Based on the majority’s posture in Humanitarian Law Project, it 
	
 85 Humanitarian Law Project, 561 U.S. at 26, 36-39. 
 86 Id. at 47-48 (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
 87 Id. at 56. 
 88 Id. at 47. 
 89 Id. at 26 (majority opinion). 
 90 735 F.3d 32, 50 (1st Cir. 2013). 
 91 Id. 
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is highly likely that the Court would reconsider its ruling in regards to 
§ 2339B’s limiting effect on speech and expression.  What seems inevitable is 
that as prosecutors intervene earlier, and more speech, including independent 
speech, is criminalized, the courts will push back and strike down the more 
egregious convictions in an effort to preserve the First Amendment. 
IV.  ALTERNATIVES 
Terrorism is a real and viable international threat.  The government un-
deniably has a compelling interest to prevent terror attacks, and the material 
support statutes are effective tools in the pursuit of that interest.  Provided 
that this is not a call for § 2339A and B to be summarily erased from the 
United States Code, it is still important to analyze the statutes, their applica-
tion, and the effects they have on the Constitution.  The sheer volume of 
literature and cases challenging the constitutionality of § 2339A and B is 
enough to suggest that there may be some conflict, and upon closer consid-
eration, there is absolutely room for the courts to find certain applications of 
the material support statutes unconstitutional, namely the criminalization of 
“conspiring to conspire,” and nonviolent advocacy.  In the alternative, gov-
ernment can still bring material support charges, among other terror-related 
charges, against more culpable suspects.  Yes, that means the government 
will have to wait longer before intervening, but that is precisely what Depart-
ment of Justice does in virtually every other criminal offense.  In fact, waiting 
longer to intervene and arrest a suspect provides law enforcement with more 
time to gather evidence and intelligence, limiting the arrests of false-positives, 
and focusing the government’s, and in turn, the courts’, efforts on the most 
likely and dangerous suspects.92 
CONCLUSION 
The material support statutes created extensive liability to nearly unprec-
edented levels.  With the criminal liability swelling and attaching earlier than 
ever before, § 2339A and B have engendered numerous constitutional at-
tacks.  Not many have been found persuasive by the justice system, although 
that may be due in part to the fact that alleged terrorists are arguably the 
least sympathetic defendants in post-9/11 America.  Nevertheless, many of 
these challenges are not wanting for merit.  Serious constitutional issues per-
sist with the statutes, and given the right circumstances, those issues may be 
exploited to strike down certain applications or provisions.  For example, the 
multi-level inchoate, “conspiring to conspire” could be in violation of the 
Constitution’s guarantee to due process; moreover, § 2339B’s criminalization 
	
 92 See generally Chesney, supra note 5, at 434-36 (weighing the pros and cons of early intervention). 
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of speech, including, albeit gradually, independent advocacy, could be viola-
tive of the freedom of speech.  The Constitution’s protections apply to every 
defendant subject to the American penal system.93  The Constitution’s pro-
tections apply irrespective of the crime committed.  The material support 
statutes should not be afforded special status, nor should they be exempt from 
the rigorous scrutiny the Constitution imposes on all statutes that infringe 
upon its provisions. 
 
	
 93 See generally Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723 (2008) (holding that noncitizens arrested abroad still 
have constitutional rights, subject to a multi-factor balancing test). 
